to develop a sphere of influence in the region. This can be seen as an 'informal' and 'cultural' form of imperialism.
2
Historians have struggled with the question of how to assess the historical importance of the Dutch pro-Boer sentiment. In secondary literature it is argued that there were several limiting factors, the most telling of which was the policy of neutrality of the government. The Netherlands could not afford to risk a conflict with its mighty neighbour over South Africa, as statesmen feared that the British would annex Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia in retaliation.
3 From the primary sources however, it appears that despite the neutrality contemporaries sought ways to mobilise public opinion for the Boer cause, not only in the Netherlands but also in other Western countries. Dutch agents played a pivotal role in the European propaganda campaign for the republics, publishing material that reached them from the war zone in South Africa. 4 As a result the contemporary debate about the South African War touched upon wider questions about the Netherlands and its position in the world as a small nation with large overseas interests.
In this article I will explore how this dilemma affected the involvement of Dutch journalists in the propaganda campaign for the Boers. By doing so, questions about the nature of the press in the Netherlands are raised.
In theoretical literature on mass communication a distinction is made between communication, aimed at informing the public, and 'propaganda', which is intended to manipulate. This idea, which emerged in the 1920s, has stimulated the view amongst scholars that journalism should be independent. 5 Looking at the historical context however, such a stance is problematic as the situation was often more complex. Journalism and propaganda in the Netherlands were not strictly separated during the South African War. I will argue that the goals of some Dutch journalists and proBoer propaganda organisations were similar, making information coming from the Boers known to the world in order to counter British views. Indeed, several journalists were leading members of propaganda organisations. This suggests that in order to fully gasp the press coverage of the South African War, historians must look beyond newspapers and also take into consideration networks that facilitated the flow of information abroad. On the following pages the meaning of the Dutch information networks will be analysed using primary source material in which contemporaries reflected on the nature of these lines of communication. It will be shown that despite their awareness of the official policy of neutrality and the limits it imposed, Dutch opinion makers pro-actively tried to influence public opinion at home and abroad. As such, the campaign for the Boers spurred initiatives to promote the interests of the Dutch 'race' in the international media. This case shows that issues connected to Modern
Imperialism had an impact on the press system in the Netherlands, a topic that
has not yet received much attention from historians. Recent historiography about media within the British Empire provides several interesting prisms through which we can view the Dutch situation. I will begin by assessing some of the concepts that have been put forward in this literature.
Historiography
It is a well established idea that the wave of globalisation during the late This thesis is an important premise of the concepts forwarded in the New Imperial History, which constitute the point of departure for this special issue of the bmgn-Low Countries Historical Review. One of the main ideas in this field of research is that information from overseas territories that reached
Europe had an impact on metropolitan identity formation. 7 First of all, the overseas information networks transferred material that generated moral issues affecting the self-image of countries in Europe. In historiography much emphasis is put on the representation of the 'civilised' western colonisers versus the 'uncivilised' indigenous populations in the periphery. In Britain 'a newspaper war'? kuitenbrouwer such imperial themes were popular in the emergent mass press. 8 In addition there was a great deal of 'othering' amongst European powers themselves in order to spruce up national prestige by showing that their own empires were better than those of rivals.
9
Although he does acknowledge that these imperial connections are relevant, Simon Potter points out that one has to be careful with these claims of the New Imperial History. In his work he asserts that the improving infrastructure between Britain and its overseas territories had great significance for the way in which the imperial press was organised. Media in all parts of the British Empire were connected and Fleet Street in London became the undisputed information hub. 10 But Potter warns against anachronism too.
The global means of communication in the late nineteenth century were not as democratic as they are in the twenty-first century. Because of the commercial and strategic interests powerful institutions regulated these networks and access was limited. The most obvious example is the intercontinental telegraph lines that were constructed after 1870. News agencies, of which
Reuters was the most important, dominated this market and newspapers depended on them for the latest information from abroad. Potter argues that in the late nineteenth century British Empire such institutions were strong, providing a rigid 'system' of information exchange. To assess the meaning of imperial press networks, one has to take into account these mechanisms and the way they were discussed by contemporaries.
11
In times of crisis, such as a large-scale war, the workings of the 
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'a newspaper war'? kuitenbrouwer news agencies and newspapers to promote information that was considered to be beneficial for the war effort and hold back the information that was considered to be harmful. Although such machinations were far more intrusive during the First World War, Jacqueline Beaumont argues that the South African War was the first conflict in which the British administration systematically tried to control information coming from the war zone.
14
The historiography of the British imperial press system is relevant to the study of the Dutch coverage of the South African War. Firstly, the conflict raised moral questions for journalists in the Netherlands. To many opinion makers the unequal fight between the mighty British Empire and the small Boer republics showed the corrupt nature of the imperialism of great powers in contrast to the righteousness of the overseas ambitions of the Dutch race, which was trying to forward the cause of civilisation across the globe. In this context the term 'pro-Boer' cannot always be taken literally, which shows the different motives for groups in the Netherlands to support the republics.
As well as the feelings of kinship, the coverage of the South African War also affected the self-image of the Dutch nation -a small power in the European state-system with large overseas interests. 
18
To understand the functioning of the press, one has to take into account the influence of such institutions. Several studies show that the awareness of these mechanisms is not new, but has historical roots. press in the colonies by Gerard Termorshuizen (Dutch East Indies) and Angelie Sens (Suriname). They assert that late nineteenth-century developments in the Dutch overseas territories were similar to those in the motherland and that the press became an important factor in public life in the colonies. ' Netherlands wrote articles to dispel these reports, they had little influence because the foreign press did not make much use of Dutch sources. 'The section "the Netherlands" in foreign periodicals is like a clown in a circus'.
40
Several members of the njk proposed to structurally monitor international newspapers, using Dutch correspondents abroad as agents.
41
This plan was part of a wider effort to professionalise the njk and turn it into a trade union. Remarkably one of the fiercest critics of this initiative was Boissevain, who was president of the njk between 1895 and 1898. He argued that the organisation primarily fulfilled a social function which would be endangered by professionalisation. 42 These views were not shared by the majority of members who voted in favour of a plan to reform the njk. After the society's constitution had changed in 1900 the most significant success was a campaign for better working conditions for journalists. 43 To improve the international reputation of the Dutch press, the njk started to host foreign journalists who came to the Netherlands to cover major events, starting with artikel -article Queen Wilhelmina's coronation in 1898. 44 In the years that followed the same happened during other royal events and the Peace Conferences in The Hague.
However, for each event a special committee was installed, so these activities remained incidental. Plans for more structural activities to influence the foreign press did not resurface in the periodical of the njk.
This might explain why there was relatively little attention given to South Africa within the njk between 1899 and 1902, although there was widespread sympathy for the Boers amongst its members. During a general meeting in 1900 for example, Boissevain was praised for his articles on behalf of the Boers. 45 Acknowledging these sentiments, the executive committee reported that it tried to take action on behalf of the republics where it could.
In 1899 the njk sent a 'confidential letter' to the most 'influential newspapers' in the Netherlands urging the editors to be careful with publications about possible strategies of the Boers because that information could be used by the British. 46 In addition, special press cards were issued to Dutch reporters who went to the war zone. 47 In December 1900, the Amsterdam branch of the njk helped to stage the hugely popular visit of Paul Kruger to the city and published several speeches. 48 There was a limit to such initiatives however, because the executive committee of the njk did not want to break with 'international courteousness'. In this way it complied with the policy of neutrality of the Dutch government. As a result, a plan to send an official letter of approval to journalists in Britain who supported the Boers (the same people Boissevain praised in his publications) was cancelled.
49
The neutral position of the njk remained in force throughout the war, as is illustrated by another example. In February 1901 the local branch in The Hague, with financial support from the government, organised the reception of representatives of the foreign press who covered the wedding of Queen Wilhelmina and Prince Hendrik. In the report on this event it was noted how several British journalists had expected a 'boorish' welcome from their colleagues in the Netherlands due to the ongoing war in South Africa. The organisers wrote however, that political issues were avoided and that there was a fraternal atmosphere, which the visiting journalists publicly acknowledged.
According to the report, this greatly contributed to the good image of Dutch journalism abroad. newspapers. Apparently the interests of the njk were best served by good ties with their British colleagues and as a result it did not become a propagandistic institution to support the 'kinsmen' in South Africa.
To some extent the dilemma of neutrality was familiar to Dutch proBoer organisations. Many members of the nzav and the anv belonged to the political and intellectual elites who did not want to embarrass the government (and themselves) by making too radical statements against the British. 51 On the other hand however, propaganda for the Boers remained a priority of these societies. During the course of 1899, this became increasingly important as British printing presses started producing numerous publications against the republics in wake of the war.
In this respect the lack of an institution that could distribute proBoer material internationally was clearly felt, for example by Willem Leyds, a Dutchman who was the main diplomatic representative of the Transvaal in Europe. He was a pivot in the European network of the Boer republics and played a crucial role in the propaganda campaign. 52 As most material appeared in the Dutch language, he needed help to make it available to other countries.
In October 1899 H.J. Kiewiet de Jonge, the secretary of the anv, wrote to Leyds about his plans to set up a press office, which were received enthusiastically.
53
The anv press office became an important link in Leyds's international campaign. Moreover it was the first organisation to propagate the interests of the Dutch 'race' in the foreign press.
In its first year the press office published some successful pamphlets (amongst others, Boissevain's pamphlet against the British press that was distributed in Britain and the United States). Initially the organisation was rather ad hoc, however. Kiewiet de Jonge constantly complained about a lack of money and human resources. Volunteers worked only briefly for the press office and some of them were completely incompetent. 
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All in all, the anv press office became a prominent institution within the pro-Boer propaganda campaign and received funding from both the nzav and Leyds until the end of the war. However it is hard to assess the actual effect of its activities between 1899 and 1902. First of all, the direct impact in the Netherlands seems to have been limited. As has been mentioned, several articles written by Rompel appeared in the national press, but it is not clear how many. There are also indications that on several occasions Dutch newspaper editors declined material offered by the anv, indicating that they could obtain enough sources themselves. 56 The international impact is even more difficult to measure. Kiewiet de Jonge was aware of the official Dutch policy of neutrality and as a result he was secretive about his propaganda activities. The press office sent circulars to newspapers with the explicit request to keep them anonymous. Therefore it is hard to assess to what extent this information was actually published. In addition, much of the material that the anv distributed seems to have been 'second hand', meaning that it was taken from other periodicals. All things considered, the anv press office probably did not have much actual effect. Despite Rompel's hard work funds remained limited, which hampered further professionalisation, and he depended on an informal network of correspondents. Nevertheless, there was a lot of goodwill amongst Dutch contemporaries for the work of the press office, which was meant to fill an important institutional gap in the nation's information networks. In its efforts to bypass the limits of neutrality during the South African War, it made information that would serve the national interest known to the world.
In a sense the anv was doing what the pro-reform members of the njk had been advocating in 1897. Therefore from the start the work of the anv was applauded in newspapers, such as in an editorial that appeared in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant that praised it as 'A campaign of the pen'. 58 Such praise was probably one of the reasons for the anv to continue with the press office after the South African War ended in June 1902.
The anv London office after 1902
Six months after the Peace of Vereeniging, Kiewiet de Jonge wrote a letter to Leyds in which he explained that he thought that there was a continuing need for his press office, even though the Boer republics had officially been annexed by the British Empire. In addition, the link with London remained in operation. As the Afrikaners had become subjects of the British Empire they needed press representatives in the imperial metropolis, the anv argued. Their most important task was to monitor newspapers for articles that could harm
Afrikaner interests and to write letters to editors to correct these views. Even though emotions had cooled somewhat after the war had ended, secrecy was still considered to be a necessity. If the London press were to find out that the anv was paying the correspondents, they probably would refuse their letters.
artikel -article
In the course of 1903 the main agent, Van Beek, proved to be increasingly unreliable in this respect. After several public controversies, Rompel terminated all contact with him in November 1905. Several of these publications praised the anv press office as the most able institution to solve this problem. 66 Rompel also received personal letters from journalists expressing their appreciation, such as from Charles Boissevain who wrote that the anv was doing 'valuable' work. 67 Aside from these incidental compliments however, there is no indication that newspapers were willing to invest in an institution that could influence foreign periodicals in a sustained way.
There seems to have been more substantial interest from the government. Both the departments of Colonies and Foreign Affairs corresponded with the anv about its efforts to counter critics of Dutch colonial policy. These efforts were applauded by high-ranking officials such as the Minister of Colonies in 1906. 68 In 1909 the department for Foreign Affairs announced that it would appoint one administrator to keep an eye on the coverage of the Netherlands and its colonies in the foreign press. In a letter to Kiewiet de Jonge, Reyneke van Stuwe noted that it was a good plan, but that this task would be impossible for just one person. He argued for a network of Dutch agents in foreign countries and urged the anv to apply for a subsidy to organise this -he also added that he would be interested in this job as he could use some extra income.
69
In the years following Kiewiet de Jonge met government officials to discuss this plan at several times, but it did not lead to lasting co-operation.
One of the reasons was that the government was reluctant to openly support the press office from fear of compromising Dutch neutrality. 70 The failure of the anv to secure structural external funds for its propaganda activities led to financial problems after 1910 when the money it had raised during the South African War ran out. 71 Another blow was the departure of Rompel, who in 1913 returned to South Africa where he became an influential opinion maker.
Initially Reyneke van Stuwe took over his tasks but in March 1914 he reported that he could not make ends meet with the money he was receiving from the anv and he had to look for other jobs as well. 72 As a result of the financial and personnel problems the anv press office scaled down its activities on the eve of the First World War.
The demise of the anv press office however, did not mean the end of attempts to influence the coverage of Dutch and colonial affairs in the foreign press. In his book about the department of Colonial Affairs Bob de Graaff provides an inventory of the (semi-)official bodies that received financial support from the Dutch government for their attempts to improve the international reputation of the Netherlands, the colonial policy in particular, during the interwar years. He considers the anv press office as the forerunner of these initiatives. 73 There seems to have been a significant continuity in the personal involvement of Kiewiet de Jonge as he and his son were commissioned by the government to supervise the activities of a new press organisation that was set up in the 1920s, a bureau ran by F.J.W. Drion.
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These semi-official activities came to an end in 1934 with the establishment of a formal public information service (Regeerings Persdienst) by the department of Foreign Affairs.
artikel -article
Reyneke van Stuwe remained involved in these activities. 
Conclusion
The 
'a newspaper war'? kuitenbrouwer
In addition the South African crisis also put the focus on the disadvantages of the international position of the Dutch press and its information networks. Journalists in the Netherlands noted that they had two problems: they depended on foreign press agencies and had few means to influence foreign newspapers. In the 1890s this situation had prompted a debate within the journalists' union njk, but little was done to address it.
After the start of the South African War, the journalists' union stuck to its policy of neutrality. In contrast, pro-Boer organisations set up institutions to form an international propaganda network, such as the anv press office.
Contemporaries in the Netherlands applauded the organisation as the first institution that tried to influence foreign media in a sustained manner.
The interwar years saw the establishment of institutions that showed great continuity with the anv press office, not least because individuals like Kiewiet de Jonge remained involved. Therefore it can be argued that the press office has had lasting effects on the Dutch information networks.
One of the reasons that the anv press office not has been thoroughly researched by Dutch press historians might be that, apart from words of praise, 
